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INTRODUCTION 
In April of 2014, Dennis Stinchcombe found a painting.1 The 
background was solid black, and it featured a spray-paint stencil 
of a man and a woman locked in an embrace while simultane-
ously looking over one another’s shoulders at their respective 
cell phones.2 Stinchcombe, a lifelong resident of Bristol, England, 
ran the Broad Plain Boys’ Club, a 120-year-old community insti-
tution that provides after-school programming to Bristol’s 
youth.3 The Boys’ Club was, at the time, facing financial difficul-
ties.4 The painting, now known to be titled Mobile Lovers, was 
the work of a street artist called Banksy, who, without anyone’s 
permission and in violation of trespass and vandalism laws, had 
surreptitiously painted the work on a piece of plywood covering 
a doorway beside a public sidewalk. Luckily, Stinchcombe was a 
fan of Banksy, and he immediately recognized Mobile Lovers as 
the work of one of the international art world’s current super-
stars.5 Stinchcombe removed the piece of plywood on which Mo-
bile Lovers was painted from the public doorway, planning to 
auction off the work and use any proceeds to fund the Boys’ 
Club’s financial recovery.6 
Almost immediately after Stinchcombe’s possession of the 
piece became public, the Bristol City Council intervened, confis-
cating Mobile Lovers and placing it on display in a municipally 
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 1 Alice Vincent, Banksy’s Mobile Lovers Located in Bristol (Telegraph, Apr 15, 
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/V94Z-YS5A. 
 2 Id.  
 3 Id.  
 4 Id.  
 5 See Vincent, Bansky’s Mobile Lovers Located in Bristol (cited in note 1).  
 6 See Ian Johnston, Banksy Breaks Cover to Join Debate over ‘Mobile Lovers’ Art-
work (Independent, May 8, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/YS7W-NCEK.  
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owned museum.7 Its claim was that, because Banksy painted 
Mobile Lovers directly onto a piece of public property, the paint-
ing belonged to the city.8 Then Banksy himself stepped in. Es-
chewing his usual silence on matters of ownership interest in his 
works, Banksy—a Bristol native and possible former patron of 
the Boys’ Club—wrote Stinchcombe a letter purporting to give 
ownership rights of Mobile Lovers to the club.9 As far as the city 
was concerned, Banksy’s letter brought the question of owner-
ship to a “proper resolution,” and the city returned Mobile Lov-
ers to Stinchcombe.10 
Other Banksy works have been subject to ownership dis-
putes as well. Consider the saga of Slave Labour, a work depict-
ing a young, downtrodden boy sitting behind a sewing machine 
and manufacturing a series of miniature Union Jacks.11 Banksy 
painted the piece—again, without anyone’s permission—on the 
side of an “everything-costs-a-pound” store in Haringey, London.12 
The piece, which is a commentary on discount stores’ labor prac-
tices, eventually became an important attraction in Haringey, 
drawing so many visitors to the neighborhood from London and 
beyond that the local subway station posted a sign reading “This 
way to our Banksy.”13 In February 2013, the piece vanished, 
ripped out of the wall on which it was painted roughly a year af-
ter it had first appeared.14 Slave Labour later resurfaced at an 
auction house in Miami; the owner of the pound store’s building 
intended to sell it.15 Though the citizens of Haringey were ini-
tially able to block the auction in Miami,16 the painting was nev-
ertheless later sold at a different auction.17 
Who owns a given work of street art? A comment clarifying 
this question will be of particular interest to the parties who 
might claim such ownership rights. This Comment focuses on 
private disputes, which, as in the above illustrations, generally 
 
 7 See id.  
 8 Id.  
 9 Id.  
 10 Johnston, Banksy Breaks Cover (cited in note 6).  
 11 Sarah Lyall, Borough Searches for Missing Boy, Last Seen on Wall (NY Times, 
Feb 28, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/CLV5-4YEQ. 
 12 Id.  
 13 Id.  
 14 See id. 
 15 See Lyall, Borough Searches for Missing Boy (cited in note 11).  
 16 Id. 
 17 Jamie Wetherbe, ‘Missing’ Banksy Mural Fetches $1.1 Million at Auction (LA 
Times, June 4, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/85FF-HUGS. 
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arise between finders of street art and owners of the property on 
which the art is found. Artists themselves might attempt to 
claim ownership rights, as Banksy seems to have implicitly done 
with his letter granting his rights in Mobile Lovers to the Boys’ 
Club. But because street artists generally break the law to pro-
duce their art, such subsequent appearances to take ownership 
of and, therefore, responsibility for such art will be rare. Addi-
tionally, as in the Slave Labour controversy, the public some-
times attempts to assert property rights of some kind over pub-
licly displayed works, preventing their removal or destruction. 
While it is an interesting question how a group of concerned citi-
zens might band together to exercise rights over street art, this 
Comment focuses on private disputes; the question of public 
powers to control street art is beyond its scope. 
This Comment will proceed in three stages. Part I will brief-
ly explain what street art is and why anyone should care about 
who owns it. Part II will then ask what doctrinal arguments 
from American property law can be made about the ownership of 
street art. Part II also attempts to determine which, if any, doc-
trinal argument most clearly resolves ownership disputes. The 
doctrinal areas surveyed will range broadly and will include the 
law of finders and abandonment, the law of gift, the law of ac-
cession, and, notably, equitable division. As will be shown, the 
factual patterns presented by these disputes over street-art 
ownership are so unusual as to render the doctrinal landscape 
highly ambiguous. Finally, this Comment will make a recom-
mendation as to what the law ought to say about ownership of 
street art. Part III will argue that the traditional doctrines of 
property law are ill equipped to decide questions of street-art 
ownership. Hence, this Comment contends that courts should 
employ their equitable powers to divide street-art ownership, 
thereby overcoming all relevant doctrinal and policy problems. 
I.  WHAT IS STREET ART AND WHY SHOULD ANYONE CARE 
ABOUT IT? 
It may be impossible to say with any kind of precision what 
“street art” is. The term is amorphous, encompassing a wide 
range of mediums and contexts.18 It is worth noting that, for le-
gal purposes, litigants will do the work of deciding what is and is 
 
 18 See Eric Wooters Yip, What Is Street Art? Vandalism, Graffiti or Public Art – 
Part I (Art Radar, Jan 21, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/ETH6-F785.  
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not street art. When someone cares enough to file suit over own-
ership of some visual work, that work will likely be valuable art. 
Nevertheless, works of street art tend to share a few common 
traits: as the Mobile Lovers and Slave Labour disputes illus-
trate, street art is generally produced in urban settings, placed 
on property without the property owner’s permission, and dis-
played where the public can see it. 
Though Banksy’s work—which consists mostly of spray-
paint murals—may currently be the world’s most recognizable 
street art, street artists produce a diverse array of work. For ex-
ample, Shepard Fairey, the artist behind President Barack 
Obama’s Hope posters, has worked in many mediums; during 
one period, he repeatedly pasted posters of Andre the Giant to 
the sides of buildings.19 The artist known as Invader creates tile 
mosaics that look like characters from his Atari-game namesake 
and affixes them to walls with grout.20 The artist TEJN uses 
bike locks to fasten sculptures to other people’s property.21 
Banksy may be the hot street artist of the moment, but there are 
many others, working in many styles and mediums and placing 
their art in locations of all kinds.22 
If street art was already ubiquitous, it has recently also be-
come extremely valuable. Street art has entered the art world’s 
mainstream, with Banksy pieces regularly selling for more than 
$1 million.23 After its return to Mr. Stinchcombe, Mobile Lovers 
sold, bringing in $670,000 for the Boys’ Club.24 Similarly, Slave 
Labour ultimately sold at a London auction for approximately 
$1.1 million.25 Other works have sold for even more, with one 
Jean-Michel Basquiat piece going for over $16 million in a 2012 
auction.26 Though neither the Mobile Lovers nor the Slave Labour 
 
 19 See Dale Eisinger, The Art Evolution of Shepard Fairey (Complex, Sept 30, 
2013), archived at http://perma.cc/Q2EA-2CJ5. 
 20 See Jaime Rojo and Steven Harrington, Street Art Tile ‘Invasion’ of New York Cut 
Short (Huffington Post, Nov 6, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/JSN6-KFSW.  
 21 See TEJN, TEJN: Art, archived at http://perma.cc/ZZ2W-V3HL.  
 22 See, for example, Sebastian Buck, The 50 Greatest Street Artists Right Now 
(Complex, Mar 22, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/W7ZT-8TAM. 
 23 See lowpro, Viewpoints: Top 25 Most Expensive Banksy Works Ever (Arrested 
Motion, Sept 21, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/38EU-E3ZW.  
 24 Benjamin Sutton, Sale of Banksy’s Mobile Lovers for $670,000 Saves Youth Club 
(Artnet News, Aug 26, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/HP45-MP3X. 
 25 See Allan Kozinn, Disputed Banksy Work Brings $1.1 Million at Auction (NY 
Times, June 3, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/4KFS-7L6T.  
 26 Mila Pantovich, The Most Expensive Street Art: From Basquiat to Banksy 
(JustLuxe, Jan 9, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/8UFL-SYM7. 
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controversies escalated into full-blown lawsuits, the stakes are 
becoming too high for interested parties to ignore the question of 
street-art ownership. Thus, American law will eventually have 
to determine who owns a given artwork.27 
II.  POSSIBLE DOCTRINAL SOLUTIONS 
A number of doctrinal solutions suggest themselves in an-
swering the question of who owns a work of street art. Each tra-
ditional doctrinal area presents at least one of two different 
kinds of difficulties. First, a given doctrine might be too narrow 
to handle the broad range of fact patterns that disputes over 
street art present. Second, some doctrinal solutions would de-
mand impossible findings of fact about artists’ subjective inten-
tions. As Part III demonstrates, only the more flexible judicial 
exercise of equitable power avoids both challenges. 
A. The Law of Finders 
The area of law most obviously implicated by the Mobile 
Lovers controversy is the law of finders. Stinchcombe found Mo-
bile Lovers, moved it inside to shield it from the harsh elements, 
and intended to sell it. Initially, the city of Bristol claimed that 
it was irrelevant that Stinchcombe found the painting; it was 
found on city property, so it was, likewise, city property. Who 
was right? Perhaps surprisingly, the answer depends on how the 
property ended up wherever it was found. 
1. Lost and mislaid property. 
“‘Lost property’ is property which the owner has involuntar-
ily parted with through neglect, carelessness, or inadvertence, 
that is, property which the owner has unwittingly suffered to 
pass out of his possession and of whose whereabouts he has no 
knowledge.”28 At common law, if the true owner never appears to 
claim her property, the finder of the property becomes its own-
er.29 By contrast, mislaid property belongs to the owner of the 
 
 27 Much street art is produced in the United States. See Joe Coscarelli, The Banksy 
Tour of New York City: Interactive Map (NY Media, Oct 31, 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/9SUR-L9TD.  
 28 Terry v Lock, 37 SW3d 202, 206 (Ark 2001). See also 1 Am Jur 2d Abandoned, 
Lost, and Unclaimed Property § 12 at 20 (2005). 
 29 1 Am Jur 2d Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed Property § 27 at 37 (cited in 
note 28). See also, for example, Smith v Purvis, 474 S2d 1131, 1132 (Ala App 1985). 
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real estate on which the mislaid property was found.30 “‘Mislaid 
property’ is that which is intentionally put into a certain place 
and later forgotten.”31 However, street art is almost certainly 
neither lost nor mislaid. It is not lost, because artists know 
where they have left their work and there is nothing inadvertent 
or careless about the placement of most street art. The artist, of-
ten through considerable effort, trespasses on the property of 
another and labors to create an entire artwork from scratch. It is 
not mislaid, because street artists do not generally “forget” their 
work under any plausible interpretation of the word. They know 
where they put it but have no intention of returning to retrieve 
it. This makes sense, given that street artists prefer not to be 
arrested and, therefore, prefer not to be caught red-handed at 
their own crime scenes. 
2. Abandoned property. 
Doctrinally, “[p]roperty is said to be ‘abandoned’ when it is 
thrown away, or its possession is voluntarily forsaken by the 
owner, in which case it will become the property of the first oc-
cupant.”32 The primary doctrinal difficulty in applying the law of 
abandonment to street art is determining whether street artists 
voluntarily forsake their work in the required manner. Professor 
Lior Strahilevitz argues that abandonment has two elements.33 
First, there must be a transfer of the property in question.34 Sec-
ond, that transfer must be unilateral.35 
Street artists’ general behavior toward their work indicates 
intent to transfer. As discussed above, it seems exceedingly un-
likely that most street artists leave their work on other people’s 
property with the intention of reclaiming it.36 Prohibitions on 
trespass and vandalism give them strong incentives not to do so. 
Hence, street artists probably expect their art to end up in 
someone else’s hands, either to be displayed, sold at auction, or de-
stroyed. Legal authority links such behavior with abandonment, 
 
 30 Terry, 37 SW3d at 207. See also 1 Am Jur 2d Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed 
Property § 14 at 22 (cited in note 28). 
 31 1 Am Jur 2d Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed Property § 14 at 22 (cited in 
note 28). 
 32 Terry, 37 SW3d at 206. See also 1 Am Jur 2d Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed 
Property § 24 at 32 (cited in note 28). 
 33 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U Pa L Rev 355, 360 (2010). 
 34 Id.  
 35 Id.  
 36 See Part II.A.1. 
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treating intentional, prolonged physical separation from one’s 
property as evidence that one has abandoned it.37 
However, for property to be abandoned, it must be not mere-
ly transferred, but unilaterally transferred. It is an interesting 
and contentious question precisely what unilateral transfer en-
tails.38 Nevertheless, the leading scholars agree on one sense in 
which abandonment transfers are unilateral. Conveyances other 
than abandonment identify in advance the person to whom the 
property is to be transferred.39 This is true with gifts, sales, and 
other conveyances, which can pick out the recipient either by 
name or by using some definite description (for example, “to my 
brother’s oldest son”). Abandonment, by contrast, is character-
ized by indifference on the part of the original owner as to who 
will take subsequent ownership.40 The transfer is unilateral in 
the sense that, when it is initiated, only one party to the trans-
fer is identified. 
Are conveyances of street art unilateral in this sense? Are 
street artists indifferent regarding the future owners of their 
work? It is extremely difficult to say. Banksy’s Mobile Lovers let-
ter is as close to a direct statement of an artist’s intent regard-
ing subsequent ownership as any court is likely to get. And that 
letter is probably legally useless, given that it likely reveals an 
intention that arose only after the city of Bristol’s confiscation 
rather than the intention Banksy had when he left the painting 
in the doorway. 
In most cases, courts will be unable to ask the anonymous 
artist about her intent and will be forced to surmise intent solely 
from the objective facts surrounding the artwork itself.41 But 
facts surrounding an artwork’s placement will generally not be 
 
 37 See Routh Wrecker Service, Inc v Wins, 847 SW2d 707, 709 (Ark 1993). 
 38 Scholars debate whether one must obtain the transferee’s consent in order to 
abandon property. See, for example, Strahilevitz, 158 U Pa L Rev at 360 (cited in 
note 33) (arguing that abandonment does not “require that a third party assume owner-
ship of the property or agree to do so”); Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Illusory Right to 
Abandon, 109 Mich L Rev 191, 200 (2010) (contending that the common law disallows 
the abandonment of land interests without the consent of a transferee). 
 39 Peñalver, 109 Mich L Rev at 198 (cited in note 38). See also Strahilevitz, 158 U 
Pa L Rev at 370–71 (cited in note 33) (noting that gift giving, unlike abandonment, car-
ries the decision cost of determining the recipient).  
 40 See Strahilevitz, 158 U Pa L Rev at 376–77 (cited in note 33). 
 41 Courts have long made such determinations of ownership in contexts other than 
street art. See, for example, Haslem v Lockwood, 37 Conn 500, 506 (1871) (considering 
who owned animal manure that had been abandoned by the animals’ owners); Eads v 
Brazelton, 22 Ark 499, 499 (1861) (deciding, years after a shipwreck, which claimant 
owned cargo submerged in the Mississippi River).  
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elucidatory. An artist’s failure to reclaim her work points only 
toward an intent to alienate. It does not speak to the artist’s in-
tent regarding future owners. Facts about the art itself can point 
toward indifference and abandonment, away from them, or in no 
particular direction. In some cases, it is clear that the artist 
cares from the outset where her work ends up. Slave Labour, for 
example, was intentionally placed on a pound store as a criti-
cism of the labor practices of such low-price retailers.42 The 
piece’s placement was integral to its meaning. Thus, it seems 
likely that Banksy, from the outset, would have preferred that 
the piece stay where he put it. But even when such intent re-
garding an artwork’s placement is evident, the artist’s intent 
with regard to future owners will be difficult to determine. Per-
haps Banksy wished to give Slave Labour as a gift to the build-
ing owner in hopes that it would remain on display at that loca-
tion.43 On the other hand, Slave Labour overtly criticizes the 
practices of the dollar store to which it was affixed, undermining 
the idea that Banksy intended to give the building owner a 
million-dollar gift. 
More commonly, the artwork itself will yield few clues to the 
artist’s intent. For example, in his early work, Fairey mass-
produced single images, placing them indiscriminately and 
ubiquitously.44 Art that is entirely non–site specific in this way 
might evince either a positive intention on the part of the artist 
to give his work to the first finder or, alternatively, a total lack 
of conscious intent regarding future ownership. 
Street artists’ intentions are nearly impossible to reliably 
discover. It is therefore difficult to say whether street artists 
transfer their work unilaterally, as required for abandonment. 
Most cases will exist in a murky gray area, in which the facts 
could be read to point toward abandonment, away from it, or in 
no direction at all. Thus, as they stand, the doctrinal rules of 
abandonment are not equipped to adjudicate more than a small 
minority of likely disputes over street-art ownership. 
B. The Law of Gift 
For someone to successfully make a gift, the following ele-
ments must be established: “(1) intent on the part of the donor to 
 
 42 See notes 11–13 and accompanying text. 
 43 For a detailed discussion on gifts, see Part II.B.  
 44 See, for example, Ian Noble, Picture Perfect: Fusions of Illustration and Design 
130 (RotoVision 2003) (discussing Fairey’s early works and his Obey Giant project). 
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make a present transfer of the property; (2) actual or construc-
tive delivery of the gift to the donee; and (3) acceptance of the 
gift by the donee.”45 Delivery and acceptance of street art are 
relatively straightforward. An artist’s placement of a work on a 
donee’s property is actual delivery, the gold standard in gift 
law.46 When the intended donee is someone other than the per-
son on whose property the art was placed, the law allows for 
constructive or symbolic delivery.47 Hence, as with the law of 
abandonment, the primary difficulty in determining whether the 
law of gift applies to cases like the Mobile Lovers dispute will be 
in divining artist intent. 
What kind of intent must the street artist have in order to 
make a gift of her artwork? The language above is somewhat 
loose. It simply requires intent to make a transfer. But there are 
many kinds of transfers. This Comment considers abandonment 
to be a kind of transfer, but there are also sales, bequests, leases 
(a limited transfer of rights), and many others. Thus, the salient 
difference between gift and, say, abandonment, cannot be a gen-
eralized intent to make just any kind of transfer. What makes 
gifts distinct is that they require a more specific intent that 
picks out some individual or a class of future owners.48 That is to 
say, one cannot give a gift to no one; one must give it to someone 
in particular. 
As already discussed, courts will rarely have direct evidence 
of artists’ intentions. They will thus have to infer intent from the 
artwork itself and the facts surrounding its placement. Some 
works, like Slave Labour, demonstrate a special connection to 
the property on which they are placed. This can cut both for and 
against the idea that the artist intended to make a gift to a par-
ticular person. On the one hand, when the meaning of the art 
depends in some way on its context, the artist would likely pre-
fer that the art remain where it was placed. One might think 
that this points toward the artist’s intent to give a gift to the 
 
 45 Bader v Digney, 864 NYS2d 606, 608 (NY App 2008). See also, for example, 
Schenker v Moodhe, 200 A 727, 728 (Md 1938); Thomas v Houston, 106 SE 466, 467 (NC 
1921). See also 38 Am Jur 2d Gifts § 14 at 771 (2010).  
 46 See, for example, In re Estate of Lamplaugh, 708 NW2d 645, 651–52 (Neb 2006) 
(“Ordinarily, actual delivery is necessary where the subject of the gift is capable of man-
ual delivery.”).  
 47 See, for example, Anagnostou v Stifel, 562 NYS2d 490, 491 (NY App 1990); Es-
tate of Bridges v Mosebrook, 662 SW2d 116, 121 (Tex App 1983).  
 48 See 2 Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 6.2 
(2003) (discussing the legal rules surrounding the various types of people to whom one 
might give a gift). 
10 SALIB_CMT_SA (CAC) (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2015  2:40 PM 
2302  The University of Chicago Law Review [82:2293 
   
building owner, who may have less incentive than others to re-
move it. On the other hand, building owners who do not recog-
nize street art as valuable may be the people most likely to de-
stroy it by power washing, tearing down, or painting over the 
work. Furthermore, in cases like Slave Labour—in which the 
work in question is overtly critical of the person on whose prop-
erty it is placed—a gift intent seems unlikely. 
Unfortunately, the conceptual content of art is rarely per-
fectly clear. It will often be difficult or impossible to tell whether 
an artist has a positive attitude, a critical attitude, or no atti-
tude at all toward the building owners on whose property she 
places her work. Indeed, for pieces like Fairey’s once-ubiquitous 
Obey Giant decals,49 it seems unlikely that the artist had any at-
titude at all toward the buildings on which he placed his work. 
It is entirely plausible to think that street artists’ primary focus 
is making art, rather than transferring it. Thus, they may have 
no intent at all regarding who should own their work. 
The question of artist intent as it relates to the law of gift is 
just as difficult a problem as it is under the law of abandonment. 
The vast majority of cases will present insufficient evidence of 
artist intent to clearly implicate the law of gift. Because of this, 
the doctrine of gift as it currently stands is, at best, only a par-
tial solution to the problem of street-art ownership. 
C. The Law of Accession 
Of all the factual and legal difficulties particular to street-
art ownership, perhaps the most unusual is street art’s sticki-
ness. Though there are many exceptions, street art is often liter-
ally stuck quite firmly to the buildings on which it is placed. 
This stickiness admits of degrees, with wheat-pasted posters 
and textiles being moderately sticky, grouted tile being fairly 
sticky, and spray paint applied directly to the side of a building 
being nearly intractably sticky. Because of this, when parties 
like the building owner in the Slave Labour dispute wish to sell 
original street art that has been painted on walls, they must cut 
the brick on which it is painted out from the wall entirely.50 
 
 49 See Victoria Carrington, I Write, Therefore I Am: Texts in the City, 8 Visual 
Commun 409, 416 (2009). See also Eisinger, The Art Evolution of Shepard Fairey (cited 
in note 19).  
 50 See Etan Smallman, How Do You Remove a Banksy Mural? (Independent, Feb 
20, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/4PUY-DN2R.  
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What should the law say about this? If, for example, a 
spray-paint mural has been clearly abandoned on someone’s 
wall and someone other than the building owner finds it, does 
the finder become the owner of the artwork and part of the un-
derlying building? If not, what does the finder’s ownership 
amount to, assuming the landowner would prefer not to have his 
building used as the finder’s permanent gallery space? 
The law of accession might be used to resolve some of these 
ambiguities. Doctrinally, “[a]ccession generally signifies the ac-
quisition of title to personal property by its conversion into an 
entirely different thing by labor bestowed on it or by its incorpo-
ration into a union with other property.”51 So, if accession gov-
erned ownership of some artwork, that work and the property to 
which it was attached would be treated as a new unitary proper-
ty. In order to avoid stickiness problems, the new unitary prop-
erty might then be allocated to the owner of the property on 
which the art was placed. The only other party who would be a 
plausible candidate for ownership under the accession regime is 
the artist. However, “[a] willful trespasser generally acquires no 
rights in the property of another by any change made in such 
property due to the trespasser’s labor or skill . . . as a party can 
obtain no right nor derive any advantage from his or her own 
wrong.”52 Thus, if no one other than the building owner ever has 
a chance to take title to the art, then no transfer of any portion 
of the underlying building can be at issue. 
But when does one property become so incorporated into an-
other that it triggers accession? As the case law reveals, the dis-
tinction is difficult to parse. For example, the law of accession is 
implicated when a new radiator is installed into a car53 but not 
by the installation of a new set of tires.54 Similarly, the law of 
accession applies when rain and sun combine to form plants, 
with ownership of those plants falling to the landowner.55 By 
contrast, when nature conspires such that privately held land 
produces wild animals, ownership of those animals is governed 
 
 51 1 Am Jur 2d Accession and Confusion § 1 at 497 (2005). See also Omaha Stand-
ard, Inc v Nissen, 187 NW2d 721, 724 (Iowa 1971).  
 52 1 Am Jur 2d Accession and Confusion § 5 at 502 (cited in note 51). See also, for 
example, Kirby Lumber Co v Temple Lumber Co, 83 SW2d 638, 646 (Tex 1935). 
 53 See Lincoln Bank & Trust Co v Netter, 253 SW2d 260, 261 (Ky 1952).  
 54 See Austrian Motors, Ltd v Travelers Insurance Co, 275 SE2d 702, 706 (Ga App 1980). 
 55 See Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership, 1 J Legal Analysis 
459, 465 (2009).  
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by the rule of first possession, rather than by accession.56 What 
factual differences do these doctrinal distinctions track? Is a car 
with a new radiator really more of a new unitary property than 
one with new tires? Aren’t both easily disassembled by a skilled 
mechanic? And why is accession triggered by wild plants but not 
by animals? Neither is readily disassembled into its constituent 
carbon and water. 
Because of this lack of doctrinal clarity, it is hard to say pre-
cisely which works of street art could be subject to accession. 
Easily removed pieces like freestanding sculptures obviously fail 
to implicate the doctrine. But what about moderately sticky 
pieces? Is tile grouted to a wall more like a set of tires or more 
like a radiator? Doctrine could point either way. What about 
spray-paint murals applied directly to walls? Generally such 
works can be moved only by simultaneously moving the walls on 
which they were painted.57 Spray-paint murals seem quite uni-
tary, but are they really more unitary than wild animals, whose 
ownership is assigned by first possession? If not, does doctrine 
offer any clear guidance as to whether any street art should be 
governed by accession? 
Perhaps the best indicators as to when accession will assign 
ownership are not the characteristics of the property itself but 
rather the problems that assignment by accession will solve. In-
deed, Professor Thomas Merrill, in Accession and Original Own-
ership, characterizes accession as a regime that competes with 
the doctrine of first possession for assignation of new property, 
with accession stepping in when doing so would resolve specific 
kinds of legal or policy problems.58 For example, accession can be 
used to assign ownership when other regimes would create inef-
ficient expenditures in races to possess, tragedies of the com-
mons, inefficient investment incentives, or collective action prob-
lems.59 Thus, when accession doctrine is unclear, courts must 
resort to policy considerations to determine whether the doctrine 
should apply. 
Given these considerations, there are two reasons why ac-
cession alone cannot assign street-art ownership. First, some 
kinds of street art, like removable sculptures, obviously do not 
 
 56 See Pierson v Post, 3 Cai R 175, 177–78 (NY 1805). See also Merrill, 1 J Legal 
Analysis at 470 n 12 (cited in note 55).   
 57 See Smallman, How Do You Remove a Banksy Mural? (cited in note 50).  
 58 Merrill, 1 J Legal Analysis at 460–61, 493 (cited in note 55). 
 59 See id at 461. 
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combine with the underlying property to create something new 
and unitary. Such works cannot implicate accession. Thus, like 
the doctrines of abandonment and gift, the doctrine of accession 
is currently equipped to resolve, at most, a minority of disputes 
over street-art ownership. Second, for a whole range of street art 
that is more firmly attached to the underlying property, doctrine 
offers little guidance as to when accession should apply. For 
such stickier art, the best measure for deciding whether acces-
sion determines ownership will be whether its doing so repre-
sents the optimal resolution of difficult legal or policy problems. 
D. Equitable Division 
Like accession, equitable division is a doctrine best applied 
when doing so will resolve some legal, factual, or policy problem. 
Unlike accession, however, a court’s power to exercise equitable 
division is not limited by confusing doctrinal tests. Equitable di-
vision refers to a court’s ability to divide ownership rights in a 
single piece of property among those with competing claims.60 
Perhaps the most famous case in which a court chose to exercise 
its power of equitable division is Popov v Hayashi.61 That case 
arose out of a dispute over Barry Bonds’s record-setting seventy-
third home run ball of the 2001 Major League Baseball season.62 
Bonds clobbered the ball into the stadium’s arcade and Alex 
Popov reached up to catch it.63 The ball hit Popov’s baseball 
glove, and Popov may or may not have had full control of it when 
he was tackled by the surrounding crowd.64 During the ensuing 
struggle, Patrick Hayashi was able—without engaging in any 
wrongful assaults—to recover and walk away with the ball.65 
The court treated the ball as having been abandoned upon being 
hit, thus becoming the property of whoever possessed it first.66 
Faced with ambiguous facts surrounding first possession, the 
court found Popov and Hayashi to have equally plausible claims 
of ownership, writing that it would be “unfair” to either party if the 
ball were awarded to just one person.67 To overcome both factual 
 
 60 See Dan Carvalho, Dividing Community Property in an Equitable Division Jurisdic-
tion—Nevada’s Confusion after McNabney v. McNabney, 30 Idaho L Rev 755, 755 (1994). 
 61 2002 WL 31833731 (Cal Super).   
 62 Id at *1.  
 63 Id. 
 64 Id at *2. 
 65 Popov, 2002 WL 31833731 at *2. 
 66 Id at *3.  
 67 Id at *7. 
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ambiguity and possible unfairness, the court chose to exercise its 
power of equitable division, awarding Popov and Hayashi “equal 
and undivided interest[s] in the ball.”68 
Courts’ historical applications of equitable division are not 
limited to abandoned home run baseballs. The doctrine is an-
cient, dating to Roman times.69 Since then, it has been used in a 
number of factual situations to overcome a wide array of difficul-
ties. For example, a New Jersey court has used it to divide up 
$775 in cash contained in an old sock when it was ambiguous 
which of the five boys who had been playing with sock was the 
true finder.70 Indeed, the general trend in American law toward 
recognizing equal property rights for so-called joint finders can 
be thought of as an informal exercise of the power of equitable 
division in cases in which it is impossible to say who took first 
possession of the property in question.71 Outside the context of 
the law of finders, a California court has equitably divided an 
interest in a common stock of prunes among those who had con-
tributed their own prunes to that common stock, overcoming the 
impossibility of determining which prunes belonged to which 
farmer.72 Equitable division can apply to real estate, as well as 
to chattels. For example, in some states, “when two or more lit-
toral owners have rights to simultaneously formed accretions, 
the rights of the owners in the accretions are to be determined 
by the doctrine of equitable division.”73 Finally, in Ghen v Rich,74 
a federal court in Massachusetts implicitly upheld whalers’ cus-
tom of awarding ownership of a slain whale to whoever killed it, 
while awarding a limited “salvage” or finder’s interest to the 
whale’s subsequent finder.75 These cases illustrate the doctrine’s 
extreme flexibility; it can determine ownership rights in a varie-
ty of contexts and apportion those rights via the consideration of 
any relevant factor. 
 
 68 Id at *8.  
 69 See R.H. Helmholz, Equitable Division and the Law of Finders, 52 Fordham L 
Rev 313, 315 (1983). 
 70 Keron v Cashman, 33 A 1055, 1056–57 (NJ Chanc 1896).  
 71 See Helmholz, 52 Fordham L Rev at 324–25 (cited in note 69). See also 1 Am Jur 
2d Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed Property § 30 at 39 (cited in note 28). 
 72 Arnold v Producers’ Fruit Co, 61 P 283, 284–85 (Cal 1900). 
 73 Lorusso v Acapesket Improvement Association, Inc, 564 NE2d 360, 367 (Mass 
1990). See also Burke v Commonwealth, 186 NE 277, 279 (Mass 1933); Allen v Wood, 152 
NE 617, 620–21 (Mass 1926).  
 74 8 F 159 (D Mass 1881). 
 75 Id at 159–60.  
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In a paper titled Equitable Division and the Law of Finders, 
Professor Richard Helmholz argues that, doctrinally, courts can 
apply equitable division whenever facts or law gives rise to com-
peting plausible claims of ownership.76 Helmholz focuses specifi-
cally on the ways in which disputes over lost or mislaid property 
can generate such claims.77 As discussed above in Part II.A.1, 
property is traditionally said to be lost when the owner has 
parted with her property involuntarily and does not know where 
it is.78 Property is mislaid when the owner has voluntarily 
placed it somewhere, only to forget it there.79 The finder has a 
right to lost property against anyone but the true owner, where-
as for mislaid property, that right vests with whoever owns the 
real estate on which the property was found.80 Given that there 
is often little to no evidence regarding the owner’s state of mind 
at the time she was separated from the lost or mislaid property, 
this distinction is famously slippery.81 In fact, when the location 
in which the lost or mislaid property was found fails to clearly 
implicate one doctrine over another, Helmholz argues that “[t]he 
distinction is built on sand.”82 For example, it is nearly impossi-
ble to determine whether a wallet found on the floor of a barber-
shop was lost or mislaid. Was the wallet taken out intentionally 
for payment, set down, forgotten, and then knocked to the 
ground? Or did it accidentally fall out of the customer’s pocket as 
he settled into the barber’s chair? If there is no way of determin-
ing whether the wallet was lost or mislaid, its finder and the bar-
bershop owner have competing plausible claims to ownership.83 
Equitable division can be applied whenever such competing 
claims arise. Helmholz argues that, among those cases in which it 
can be applied, equitable division should be applied when doing 
 
 76 Helmholz, 52 Fordham L Rev at 322–25 (cited in note 69). See also, for example, 
Popov, 2002 WL 31833731 at *8 (applying equitable division to property that had been 
abandoned, rather than lost or mislaid). 
 77 See Helmholz, 52 Fordham L Rev at 314 (cited in note 69). 
 78 See notes 28–29 and accompanying text.  
 79 See notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
 80 See notes 29–30 and accompanying text.  
 81 See Helmholz, 52 Fordham L Rev at 313 (cited in note 69). 
 82 Id at 317. See also Edward R. Cohen, The Finders Cases Revisited, 48 Tex L Rev 
1001, 1006 (1970) (“[T]here is no fundamental difference between deliberately placing an 
object on a surface and unintentionally forgetting and leaving it there, and deliberately 
placing an object in your pocket and unintentionally having it leave your possession 
through a hole.”). 
 83 This example was modified from the facts of McAvoy v Medina, 11 Allen 548 
(Mass 1866).  
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so would solve some set of legal or policy problems. In cases like 
the wallet in the barbershop, the law’s goal is returning the 
property to the true owner.84 It was long thought that the 
lost/mislaid distinction achieved this goal because mislaid prop-
erty would be held where the owner could remember having left 
it.85 However, the law of mislaid property strips finders of any 
possible claims to their findings, thereby incentivizing them to 
conceal whatever they find.86 This makes recovery by the owner 
less likely.87 Thus, applying equitable division to cases in which 
lost or mislaid property gives rise to competing claims solves 
three problems: First and foremost, it removes the incentive for 
finders to secrete their findings and allows the property to be 
held where the true owner will most likely come looking.88 Sec-
ond, the equitable division of lost or mislaid property between 
the finder and the owner of the premises on which it was found 
may comport with a general instinct for fairness.89 After all, both 
parties had something of a hand in the story of the lost item. Fi-
nally, the uniform application of equitable division creates clari-
ty and predictability in an otherwise-unpredictable legal space, 
reducing the opportunity for disputes between and manipulation 
by the parties.90 Hence, such instances of ambiguous loss or mis-
laying are good candidates for the application of equitable division. 
Disputes over street-art ownership are likely to arise in con-
texts in which equitable division can apply. Indeed, as argued 
above, the facts surrounding street-art production and placement 
are so unusual that, for any given case, there will likely be equal-
ly strong arguments that the art was abandoned and that it was a 
gift.91 Certainly, the objective facts surrounding street art point 
both ways. This means that—as with lost and mislaid property—
finders of street art and owners of the underlying property will 
generally have competing plausible claims of ownership. As such, 
a court could justifiably apply equitable division of ownership to a 
great number of disputes over street-art ownership. 
The question, then, becomes whether courts should apply 
equitable division when adjudicating disputes over street art. 
 
 84 See Helmholz, 52 Fordham L Rev at 313 (cited in note 69). 
 85 See id.  
 86 See id at 314.  
 87 See id.  
 88 See Helmholz, 52 Fordham L Rev at 314–15 (cited in note 69). 
 89 See id at 315.  
 90 See id. 
 91 See Parts II.A.2, II.B, II.D. 
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The answer to that question depends on whether doing so would 
create an optimal solution to some set of difficult legal, factual, 
or policy problems. Certainly, applying equitable division to 
street art could solve some of the same problems it solves for lost 
and mislaid property. Equitable division of street art between 
the finder and the underlying-property owner might comport 
with some notion of fairness. It might also create uniformity in a 
currently murky and manipulable area of the law. However, as 
discussed in the following Part, questions of street-art owner-
ship implicate a dizzying array of policy questions. Other plau-
sible solutions to the problem of street-art ownership exist, and 
each one could, to some extent, solve the relevant policy prob-
lems. Nevertheless, as argued below, equitable division of street 
art represents the best outcome for all interested parties. 
III.  RECOMMENDATION: COURTS SHOULD EQUITABLY DIVIDE 
STREET ART BETWEEN FINDERS AND OWNERS OF THE 
UNDERLYING PROPERTY ON WHICH THE ART IS FOUND 
The previous Parts describe how courts might adjudicate 
disputes over street-art ownership. This Part argues for a single, 
optimal approach. The ideal legal regime for allocating private 
ownership will be one that both fits within existing case law and 
balances the relevant policy considerations in such a way as to 
produce the best possible outcomes. 
In considering which legal doctrine or doctrines could be 
used to adjudicate such disputes, the above considerations leave 
open a number of approaches. As argued above, the traditional 
doctrinal categories—loss, mislaying, abandonment, gift, and ac-
cession—are insufficiently developed to be able to govern all 
likely disputes. Nevertheless, a court might choose to stretch one 
of these existing doctrines, expanding its scope in such a way 
that it governs a majority of cases. Alternatively, courts could 
leave the doctrinal concepts as they lie, applying one traditional 
doctrinal regime or another on an ad hoc basis. Finally, courts 
could, as this Comment advocates, apply none of the traditional 
doctrinal categories and instead exercise their equitable powers. 
This Comment argues that a uniform application of courts’ flexi-
ble equitable powers is both legally defensible and, from a policy 
standpoint, far superior to the alternative regimes. 
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A. Pure Abandonment: Pros and Cons 
A pure abandonment regime has many advantages; consid-
ering it first will bring into focus the policy questions at stake in 
determining how to allocate street-art ownership. However, a 
pure abandonment regime would ultimately prove untenable be-
cause it would create a bizarre power of private eminent domain 
held by the very artists who trespass on private land to produce 
their work. 
1. Doctrinal fit. 
As discussed above, the main doctrinal difficulty in applying 
the law of abandonment to disputes over street-art ownership 
springs from the ambiguity surrounding artist intent. Doctrinal-
ly, for the law of abandonment to apply, the artist must be indif-
ferent to the identity of any subsequent owner of her work. Be-
cause of the manner in which street art is usually produced, it is 
usually difficult or impossible to discern whether artists act with 
such indifference. 
Courts, however, could elect to stretch the current doctrine, 
treating all street art as presumptively abandoned unless some 
other intention is clearly demonstrated. A rebuttable presump-
tion of indifference is plausible, though perhaps not more plau-
sible than other conceivable presumptions about artist intent. 
Street artists continually place their work in public, where it 
may be defaced by graffiti taggers, destroyed by property owners 
or municipalities, or auctioned to the highest bidder. Despite 
these risks, street artists choose to continue producing work. 
This behavior could suggest that, if artists do care about who 
owns their work, they do not care very much. Furthermore, if 
artists did wish to produce art for a particular person, they could 
do so by creating art in the traditional manner and selling it di-
rectly to that person. 
2. Public policy: street-art preservation and highest-value use. 
Street art can be extremely valuable. Pieces like Mobile 
Lovers and Slave Labour can easily sell for hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars, and prices regularly climb into the millions.92 
Clearly, many people care a lot about street art. Hence, the de-
struction or defacement of a valuable work of street art amounts 
 
 92 See Johnston, Banksy Breaks Cover (cited in note 6). 
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to a substantial net social loss. Unfortunately, street art is un-
der constant threat of being defaced or destroyed. Destruction 
generally occurs at the hands of building owners, including gov-
ernments, or government entities acting on building owners’ be-
half.93 Even when street art is extremely valuable, property 
owners, especially institutional and corporate owners, often fail 
to recognize the value of the relevant street art and may destroy 
the piece.94 This practice is so common that Banksy satirized it 
in a piece called Cave Painting, which depicts a worker using a 
power washer to “clean up” priceless prehistoric cave paint-
ings.95 
Aside from property owners, the other significant threat to 
street art is, perhaps ironically, graffiti. It is outside the scope of 
this Comment to differentiate street art from graffiti, but if one 
were to do so, one would do well to consider that street artists, 
by and large, intend to improve or beautify property, while graf-
fiti writers often intend to deface it.96 Graffiti writers deface 
property indiscriminately, targeting the work of street artists 
just as readily as subway cars, street signs, and building walls. 
For example, during Banksy’s unauthorized 2013 New York City 
residency, the artist created over thirty works across the city; of 
those works, at least twelve have now been defaced or destroyed 
by graffiti taggers.97 
One possible reason that street art is regularly destroyed is 
that it often lands in the possession of someone—perhaps a 
building owner—who does not value it very highly. A building 
owner may not have much of an interest in art, may not visit the 
building regularly enough to enjoy the piece, or may not see any 
viable commercial advantage to continuing to possess such a 
piece. An art collector or a community in which art is placed 
might value the work significantly more. The art collector may 
reap significant personal enjoyment from owning a given piece, or 
she may add the piece to a large portfolio, collecting for commercial 
 
 93 For example, the city of Chicago runs a program whereby citizens can request 
removal of “graffiti,” and the city will send a “‘blast’ truck” to power wash the area on 
which the “graffiti” has been placed. Graffiti Removal Program (City of Chicago), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/Y6D4-JT6Y.  
 94 See, for example, Post Staff Report, City ‘Cleans Up’ after Banksy Art (NY Post, 
Oct 17, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/7SZ2-CUA8. 
 95 Cave Painting by Banksy (Stencil Revolution), archived at http://perma.cc/JXW9-PPYU. 
 96 Lindsay Bates, Bombing, Tagging, Writing: An Analysis of the Significance of 
Graffiti and Street Art *79 (unpublished master’s thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 
Jan 1, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/ZXE9-628J. 
 97 See Coscarelli, The Banksy Tour of New York City (cited in note 27).  
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purposes. A community might have a very high valuation of a 
piece, given that the aggregate pleasure its members derive 
from interacting with it is likely to be higher than most individ-
uals’ enjoyment.98 Furthermore, truly notable works of street art 
may draw tourists, leading to commercial growth. To promote 
the general welfare, it is in the public interest to promote the 
highest and best use of any given property. Rather than forcing 
it to languish with a relatively low-valuation owner, the law 
should open avenues for property to flow continuously toward its 
highest-value use.99 
One efficient way to promote the highest-value use of prop-
erty is through sales. When a relatively low-value owner owns 
property, it is often efficient to sell that property to a higher-
value user. The high-value user will make an offer that is equiv-
alent to or less than the total value the user expects to extract 
from the property, and, if that price is indeed higher than the 
valuation of the low-value owner, the owner will be happy to 
sell. Given its clandestine and unsolicited production, street art 
may be more likely than other property to languish with a low-
value owner. Unlike most commercial products, street art is 
generally not produced either in contractual relationships for 
buyers who are readily able to valuate them or by producers who 
are willing and motivated to find such buyers. When an artist 
places a work on another person’s property, the property owner 
has no relationship with the artist, contractual or otherwise. 
The owner has not requested the art, and she may be both unin-
terested in determining its value ex ante and ill equipped to do 
so. Furthermore, since street artists generally prefer to remain 
anonymous, they are constrained in their ability to alert poten-
tial high-value users100 to the existence of their work. And even 
if they could, they have little incentive to do so since they are 
unlikely to reap the rewards of such actions. Street art, especial-
ly when it is produced by artists less famous than Banksy, faces 
 
 98 See, for example, Lyall, Borough Searches for Missing Boy (cited in note 11) (docu-
menting the efforts of the Haringey citizens to keep Slave Labour in their neighborhood). 
 99 See Strahilevitz, 158 U Pa L Rev at 416–17 (cited in note 33) (suggesting that 
abandonment may be a more effective doctrinal mechanism than adverse possession to 
cause land to flow to the highest-value user in situations in which a property owner 
wishes to lose her property interest in land).  
 100 A high-value user need not be willing to pay millions for an artist’s work. Rather, 
the relevant high-value user here is merely someone who values a work more highly 
than the sum of the underlying-property owner’s subjective valuation and the transac-
tion costs of any sale.  
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significant barriers to market entry. If no one has any incentive 
to alert high-value users to the existence of street art, then the 
art is as likely to languish and be destroyed as it is to become 
the subject of an efficient market transaction. Hence, it is in the 
public interest to define legal rules such that they help overcome 
these barriers. 
Bargaining cannot resolve these difficulties. Motivated find-
ers of street art are unlikely to be able to sell their knowledge 
about valuable artwork to property owners. Property owners 
who have no idea what finders wish to sell them are unlikely to 
pay for unknown information. Likewise, if finders tell owners 
that they are selling information about valuable artwork on the 
owners’ property, owners are likely to investigate the art them-
selves, discover its value, and avoid paying the finder. 
A pure abandonment regime would go some distance toward 
preserving street art’s value and encouraging its highest-value 
use. Professor Strahilevitz praises the law of abandonment for 
its ability to overcome high transaction costs.101 Abandonment 
lacks the marketing costs of a sale and the decision costs of a 
gift.102 And indeed, governing street-art ownership under a per 
se abandonment rule is a relatively efficient way to overcome 
the special informational transaction costs associated with 
street art. 
An abandonment regime gives those with special knowledge 
of street art’s value an incentive to reveal that knowledge and 
protect the work before it is defaced or destroyed. Under the 
abandonment regime, finders of street art will be awarded own-
ership rights. Knowing this, those with a special love for, or skill 
in identifying, street art will have good reason to either actively 
search for it or at least keep their eyes open for it as they go 
about their daily business. Consequently, rather than languish-
ing, being defaced, or being destroyed while sitting on the prop-
erty of a street-art philistine or an absentee landlord, street art 
will be claimed, protected, and presumably placed into the 
stream of commerce relatively soon after it is created. An aban-
donment regime thus helps to avoid the net social loss of street-
art destruction and also encourages the transfer of a work to-
ward its highest-value use.  
 
 101 Strahilevitz, 158 U Pa L Rev at 386 (cited in note 33). 
 102 See id at 386–87.  
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One objection to the use of an abandonment regime to allo-
cate street-art ownership is that the regime’s incentivization of 
finders to search for street art might have negative effects. One 
might argue that it is wasteful to push a number of people to de-
vote time and energy to acquiring art when another regime 
would assign ownership with no such search. While it is true 
that the incentivization of finders to look for art implies a social 
cost, that cost should never rise above what is reasonable. For 
each individual searcher, the expected value of searching is the 
value (subjective or market) of the art to be found multiplied by 
the probability of that individual being the first finder. This lat-
ter factor depends in part on the number of other active search-
ers. Taking these considerations into account, it is clear that the 
abandonment regime does not incentivize total searching ex-
penditures above the total value of the art to be found and does 
not incentivize individual searchers whose expected value of 
searching is lower than their next-best alternatives. 
3. Public policy: protecting the right to exclude. 
Property owners’ rights of exclusion are fundamentally ex-
pressed in the law of trespass. Though the right to exclude is not 
always absolute, it is deeply ensconced in American law.103 Any 
solution to the question of street-art ownership must then take 
proper account of this right. The major source of possible tres-
passes on private land in relation to street art is by the artists 
themselves. One might worry that a given rule for resolving 
ownership disputes might incentivize more trespasses by street 
artists for the purpose of producing more art. This result, how-
ever, seems unlikely. First, trespass and vandalism remain ille-
gal everywhere, so no matter the ownership regime, artists will 
have strong incentives to refrain from trespassing. Second, none 
of the live doctrinal resolutions would strengthen street artists’ 
incentives to produce work. In most cases, the laws of abandon-
ment, gift, and accession, or the application of equitable division, 
would vest ownership rights directly with someone other than 
the artist. And even when these doctrines might vest ownership 
in the artist—as with a revoked abandonment or a rejected 
gift—the artist will presumably continue to prefer anonymity 
 
 103 See, for example, State v Shack, 277 A2d 369, 373–74 (NJ 1971) (recognizing that 
“[a] man’s right in his real property of course is not absolute” and “find[ing] it unthinka-
ble that the farmer-employer can assert a right to isolate the migrant worker in any re-
spect significant for the worker’s well-being”).  
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and freedom from criminal penalty to the exercise of those 
rights. All of this is to say that the benefits that might flow from 
any proposed solution, including profits from sales of street art, 
are unlikely to flow to street artists. 
Under an abandonment regime, one could perhaps imagine 
a clever artist who would produce work, tell a friend where it 
was, and have the friend immediately claim it. They could then 
conspire to sell the work for a profit. This outcome seems unlike-
ly for two reasons. First, for street artists like Banksy or Fairey, 
whose work is likely to sell for substantial sums, the option of le-
gitimate production104 and sales is a much simpler avenue to fi-
nancial gain. Second, such a scheme would create a kind of Peter 
Parker/Spider-Man problem. Just as it is somewhat suspicious 
that, in the fictional Marvel universe, Peter Parker is the only 
photographer able to capture images of the elusive Spider-Man,105 
it would eventually become suspicious that a single person or 
small group of people was so consistently able to immediately 
discover the location of valuable street art. Hence, whatever 
street artists’ current incentives are to trespass and produce 
work, no ownership regime is likely to alter those incentives.106 
A second category of possible trespassers onto private land, 
however, might be aspiring collectors of street art. Under the 
abandonment regime—in which works of street art become the 
property of whoever discovers them first—there is an incentive 
for potential finders to search for art wherever it might be found. 
Indeed, such “lawless races” may be a generalized objection to as-
signing ownership via the law of abandonment.107 Strahilevitz ar-
gues that lawless races are of the greatest concern when they 
are truly lawless—that is, when they involve violence or other 
serious illegal acts.108 There is no ex ante reason to think that a 
regime incentivizing finders to search for street art will engen-
der violence any more than existing regimes incentivizing, for 
example, searches for buried treasure.109 
 
 104 Fairey’s contract to produce the President Obama’s now-iconic Hope images is an 
example of a legitimate production. See William Booth, Obama’s On-the-Wall Endorse-
ment (Wash Post, May 18, 2008), archived at http://perma.cc/6K86-7H5C.  
 105 See Spider-Man (Peter Parker) (Marvel), archived at http://perma.cc/KDZ9-VPT5.  
 106 It is worth noting that these considerations apply with equal strength to the ef-
fects of possible ownership regimes on rates of vandalism. 
 107 Strahilevitz, 158 U Pa L Rev at 374–75 (cited in note 33). 
 108 See id. 
 109 See, for example, Benjamin v Lindner Aviation, Inc, 534 NW2d 400, 406 (Iowa 1995). 
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Nevertheless, an abandonment regime incentivizes mem-
bers of the public to seek out street art, and street art is often 
found on private land.110 But it is not clear that these facts alone 
imply that the employment of an abandonment regime will sig-
nificantly increase the rate of trespass. First, one of street art-
ists’ goals is for their work to be seen, so they are likely to place 
works such that they can be viewed without trespassing into the 
darkest recesses of private property. Hence, finders will likely be 
able to discover street art without any trespass at all. Second, 
trespass remains a civil and sometimes criminal offense in most 
jurisdictions. If finders of street art hope to recover and, per-
haps, legitimately sell the work that they find, they will face the 
additional challenge of simultaneously maintaining their ano-
nymity for the purposes of avoiding prosecution. This problem 
will be especially difficult for potential sellers of very sticky 
street art. For example, it would be nearly impossible to excise a 
spray-paint mural from a wall without alerting the building 
owner. Therefore, finders of street art are likely to be more de-
terred by legal prohibitions against trespass than are street art-
ists. These considerations give little reason to think that the 
governance of street-art ownership by any regime that incentiv-
izes finders to search for valuable art will have a significant ef-
fect on trespass rates. 
4. Public policy: free alienation and fragmentation. 
American law disfavors limitations on the freedom of aliena-
tion. For example, though governments may exercise their 
rights of eminent domain by taking a citizen’s property and 
compensating her for it,111 no corresponding private right of em-
inent domain exists. Thus, while the law allows the government 
to force landowners to alienate their property, it strictly limits 
the parties who have that power and the contexts in which that 
power can be employed. Similarly, most states have eliminated 
the ancient fee tail, a legal method for tightly restricting future 
 
 110 Consider the placement of Slave Labour. See Lyall, Borough Searches for Miss-
ing Boy (cited in note 11) (describing how Slave Labour was stenciled on the wall of a 
store). Also consider the placement of the various works that Banksy produced during 
his New York City residency. See note 97 and accompanying text; Alice Vincent, et al, 
Banksy Better Out Than In Map: See Where the Street Artist Has Painted (Telegraph, 
July 1, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/AM6M-7G7U.  
 111 See US Const Amend V. 
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sales of real property in an estate.112 Suspicion of intrusions on 
property owners’ right of free alienation probably springs from a 
number of considerations, one of which is economic efficiency.113 
As discussed above, it is in the general public interest that prop-
erty be put to its highest-value use, and sales are a reasonably 
good way of serving that goal. Hence, restrictions on alienation 
impede economic efficiency. 
American law and public policy also disfavor property frag-
mentation. Public policy favors the easy identification of the 
owners of real property. Among other things, readily identifiable 
real property interests lower transaction costs and help to en-
sure that buyers actually get what they think they are paying 
for.114 To this effect, most developed countries employ some offi-
cial system for tracking ownership of real property and quieting 
disputes over titles.115 When property interests are highly com-
plex and not easily recordable, such a system is thus subject to 
increased transaction costs. 
A pure abandonment regime fares poorly with respect to 
these considerations. Under such a system, no matter the char-
acter of the street art in question, a finder of a given work of art 
becomes its owner. However, as discussed in Part II.C, some 
kinds of street art are extremely sticky. Spray-paint murals, es-
pecially, are so firmly attached to the underlying wall that the 
two are inseparable. Hence, under a pure abandonment regime, 
for a finder’s full ownership of a spray-paint mural to be mean-
ingful, the finder would have to take some rights over a portion 
of the underlying wall. At the very least, these rights would in-
clude a right to prohibit the demolition of the wall to which the 
art was attached. Furthermore, one might think that a finder’s 
ownership of a spray-paint mural would be meaningless without 
the included right to remove the work from its current location. 
Such a removal right would give a finder even more power over the 
underlying property. This presents either a significant freedom-of-
 
 112 See John A. Borron Jr, 1 Simes & Smith: The Law of Future Interests § 313 
(Thomson/West 3d ed 2002). 
 113 See Max Gibbons, Comment, Of Windfalls and Property Rights: Palazzolo and 
the Regulatory Takings Notice Debate, 50 UCLA L Rev 1259, 1283 (2003) (arguing that 
“free alienation of property is efficient most of the time”). 
 114 See Gerald Korngold, For Unifying Servitudes and Defeasible Fees: Property 
Law’s Functional Equivalents, 66 Tex L Rev 533, 570 (1988) (arguing that recording sys-
tems “minimize transaction costs by keeping ownership information current”). 
 115 See 66 Am Jur 2d Records and Recording Laws § 40 at 102–03 (2011) (outlining 
the purpose of recording statutes in the American system). 
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alienation problem or a significant fragmentation problem. If 
finders possess exclusive rights to works that remain attached to 
the underlying property, that property becomes fragmented. 
Furthermore, insofar as the finder gains rights to some portion 
of the underlying wall, this option forces the landowner to alien-
ate some portion of her property. Even if the finder were forced 
to compensate the landowner for that portion of the wall, such a 
solution would look like a kind of private eminent domain power, 
with the initial power exercised by lawbreaking street artists. 
The policy considerations stemming from free alienation 
and fragmentation weigh against adopting a pure abandonment 
regime to assign ownership of street art. Even if they did not, 
such a solution just seems wrong: it cannot be the case that, 
when an artist trespasses on private land to produce—in viola-
tion of local vandalism ordinances—an unsolicited spray-paint 
mural, the law grants that artist the power to force the property 
owner to alienate some portion of her property. There are many 
advantages to an abandonment regime. Chiefly, it overcomes the 
significant policy problem of street-art defacement and destruc-
tion, and it promotes street art’s highest-value use. However, 
given the bizarre effects of such a regime for alienation and 
fragmentation, a pure abandonment regime should not govern 
street-art ownership. 
B. Abandonment Modified by Accession: Close, but No Cigar 
As discussed above, the doctrine of accession is brought to 
bear exactly when doing so will resolve difficult legal, factual, or 
policy problems.116 If accession can be brought to bear in avoiding 
poor investment incentives, inefficient races, and tragedies of the 
commons, why not bring it to bear in avoiding a pure abandon-
ment regime’s perverse effects for alienation and fragmentation? 
Since governance of street-art ownership by an abandon-
ment regime carries so many virtues, the goal of a hybrid 
abandonment/accession system would be to preserve those ef-
fects whenever possible. That is to say, abandonment would 
govern whenever no serious alienation or fragmentation prob-
lems arise. However, when the street art in question would pose 
such problems under the abandonment regime, accession would 
step in to govern. Such works would automatically become the 
sole property of whoever owns the property to which they were 
 
 116 See Part II.C. 
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attached. Recall that this seems to be more or less how accession 
works in the case law. While the doctrinal question of when two 
properties have been combined into a new unitary whole is ex-
tremely difficult, courts’ inconsistencies on the question might 
well be explained by asking whether the application of accession 
would solve the relevant difficulties.117 
What kinds of street art would be governed by accession un-
der such a system? Likely only the stickiest kinds. Spray-paint 
murals applied directly to brick would almost certainly be sub-
ject to accession. As discussed above, such work strongly impli-
cates problems for alienation and fragmentation.118 But what 
about other, moderately sticky mediums like tile grouted to 
walls or posters pasted to buildings? Insofar as these kinds of 
work are, albeit with difficulty, removable, they pose no serious 
problems for free alienation or fragmentation. As such, they and 
all other moderately sticky to nonsticky works of street art 
would, under this proposal, be governed by abandonment. This 
outcome maximizes the portion of street art that would be sub-
ject to the serious benefits of governance by the abandonment 
regime. 
The problem with the hybrid approach is the popularity of 
spray paint as a street-art medium. Though street art can range 
across an incredibly diverse spectrum of mediums, paint applied 
directly to private property has been and remains by far the 
movement’s most popular.119 Furthermore, pieces like Mobile 
Lovers and Slave Labour, both spray-paint murals, are some of 
the street-art world’s most valuable works.120 Hence, while the 
hybrid abandonment/accession approach solves the alienation 
and fragmentation problems, it largely undercuts the original 
benefits of the pure abandonment regime. A great number of 
street-art works are left without incentives for protection or ve-
hicles to highest-value use, including many of the works that 
are—because of their high value—most worth protecting. The 
combination of abandonment with accession is then, at best, an 
imperfect answer to the question of street-art ownership. 
 
 117 See Part II.C.  
 118 See Part III.A.  
 119 Consider RJ Rushmore and Caroline Caldwell, The 50 Most Influential Street Art-
ists of All Time (Complex, Oct 11, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/N54H-KQ2A (listing 
the most influential street artists and noting that several of them work mostly in paint).  
 120 See Introduction. 
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C.  Ad Hoc Adjudication or the Law of Gift: The Worst of All 
Possible Worlds 
While the other traditional doctrinal regimes are not entirely 
implausible as choices for governing street-art ownership, they fare 
either no better or worse than the hybrid abandonment/accession 
regime in all important respects. More importantly, no system 
fares as well as governance by equitable division. As will be 
demonstrated below, neither ad hoc adjudication nor the law of 
gift creates very good incentives for street-art discovery and 
preservation. An ad hoc system provides insufficient certainty 
with regard to ownership rights to incentivize investment in 
such activities. The law of gift provides such incentives only to 
underlying-property owners—the parties least likely to be well 
positioned to discover and preserve artwork. 
1. Doctrinal fit. 
Rather than creating a per se regime that would govern 
most cases, courts could allow the various legal doctrines to lie 
as they are, applying whichever one seems most appropriate in a 
given case. However, such an ad hoc solution would be doctrinal-
ly untenable. As discussed above, no single regime is implicated 
by the relevant case law as the most appropriate for governing 
the majority of street-art disputes.121 Hence, in the absence of a 
per se rule, courts’ choices in future cases among these various 
doctrines would be totally arbitrary. Arbitrariness infuses signif-
icant uncertainty into the law, making it difficult for citizens to 
plan their activities around settled expectations.122 
But what about the alternative per se regimes? Courts 
might try to eliminate such arbitrariness by instituting a per se 
regime favoring either the law of gift or the law of accession. A 
regime governed by a per se gift assumption would assume, un-
less the artist clearly demonstrated some other intention, that 
any given work of street art was a gift to the owner of the under-
lying property. As discussed above, the evidence in favor of such 
an assumption is generally no stronger than the evidence in fa-
vor of the artist’s intent to abandon.123 Some works, like Slave 
 
 121 See Introduction.  
 122 See, for example, R. George Wright, Arbitrariness: Why the Most Important Idea 
in Administrative Law Can’t Be Defined, and What This Means for the Law in General, 
44 U Richmond L Rev 839, 840–41 (2010) (“Arbitrariness . . . is seemingly linked with 
uncertainty, variability, and unpredictability.”).  
 123 See Part II.B.  
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Labour, might themselves point away from a gift intention. 
Some might point toward it. The majority of street art offers no 
clues as to artist intent. As such, a per se gift assumption is 
about equally doctrinally plausible as a per se abandonment 
assumption. 
A per se accession assumption fares much worse. Doctrinal-
ly, accession governs only when two pieces of old property have 
combined to create something entirely new. Many pieces of 
street art—for example, sculptures—exhibit no such pattern. In-
sofar as street art continues to evolve and broaden beyond its 
earliest paint-on-brick days, accession will continue to be a 
worse and worse doctrinal fit for ownership determinations of a 
vast array of works. 
2. Public policy: street-art preservation and highest-value use. 
Both the pure abandonment regime and, as will be dem-
onstrated, the use of equitable division serve the important poli-
cy functions of preserving street art and promoting its highest-
value use. An ad hoc regime presents little incentive for anyone 
to invest in claiming, preserving, or marketing street art. Inso-
far as a regime is arbitrary and unpredictable, anyone—
including underlying-property owners and members of the gen-
eral public—who might wish to discover, preserve, or otherwise 
invest in street art will be discouraged from doing so by the 
looming possibility that the law will ultimately grant ownership 
to someone else. 
Both a per se gift regime and a per se accession regime 
would, more or less automatically, vest street-art ownership 
with owners of property on which street art has been placed. 
Such regimes likewise do little to encourage street-art discovery, 
preservation, and highest-value use. As discussed above, there is 
no reason to expect that any given property owner is particular-
ly likely to be a patron of the arts, and a property owner is thus 
likely to deface or destroy street art or to let it languish with a 
low-value owner.124 Hence, neither a gift regime nor an accession 
regime serves the policy goals of preserving street art and pro-
moting its highest-value use. 
 
 124 See Part III.A.2. 
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3. Public policy: protecting the right to exclude. 
As discussed above, an abandonment regime might increase 
marginal incentives for potential finders of street art to trespass 
onto private land.125 None of the other candidate regimes faces 
this difficulty. An ad hoc regime creates little incentive for find-
ers to search for street art, since they will have no assurance 
that, should they discover anything, their efforts will be reward-
ed with ownership rights. Likewise, the per se gift and per se ac-
cession regimes create no incentives for finders because they al-
locate ownership of street art to property owners more or less 
automatically. When there is no incentive to search for street 
art, there is no marginal incentive to trespass. 
However, as argued above, regimes that incentivize finders 
of street art create, at most, a weak incentive for those finders to 
trespass.126 Hence, if there is any benefit to the alternative re-
gimes’ lack of a marginal incentive to trespass, it is a small one, 
weighing only minutely in favor of such regimes. 
4. Public policy: free alienation and fragmentation. 
A per se gift regime assumes that any work of street art was 
a gift to the underlying-property owner. Therefore, no problems 
concerning free alienation or fragmentation generally arise un-
der such a regime. One could imagine scenarios in which, for ex-
ample, the artist manifests a clear intention to abandon a spray-
paint mural. Then, the per se gift regime would give way to 
abandonment, and alienation and fragmentation problems 
might arise. Courts could remedy such problems by applying the 
law of accession in such cases, which, by granting ownership of 
the art to the property owner, would raise no alienation or frag-
mentation concerns. Such a system would fare no worse than 
other regimes on alienation and fragmentation grounds, but it 
would include no policy benefits regarding art preservation and 
highest-value use. 
C. Equitable Division: The Best of All Possible Worlds 
When faced with factual ambiguity in a custody dispute over 
a baby boy, King Solomon called for his sword.127 He decreed 
 
 125 See Part III.A.3. 
 126 See Part III.A.3. 
 127 1 Kings 3:24 (New English Bible). 
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that the child would be sliced in half and divided between the 
women making claims of motherhood.128 Solomon’s decree of eq-
uitable division was an information-forcing bluff,129 but even in 
ancient times, the doctrine was used to overcome ambiguity in 
service of the public good. The question of street-art ownership 
remains beset by legal, factual, and policy problems. It is in pre-
cisely such a situation that courts can and should exercise their 
equitable powers to divide property ownership, thereby solving 
such problems in a manner that is reasonable and predictable. 
The equitable division of street-art ownership between the find-
er and the property owner fares much better than all other solu-
tions on every relevant metric, resolving all serious difficulties 
without any of the downsides that encumber other regimes. 
1. Doctrinal fit. 
As discussed above, equitable division is not a narrow doc-
trinal area that applies only to certain kinds of property or only 
when parties exhibit certain kinds of intent.130 Rather, courts 
can apply equitable division whenever multiple parties have 
competing plausible claims to a given property.131 Such applica-
tion can span across doctrinal areas, resolving disputes over 
property that could be considered lost, mislaid, or abandoned, or 
even disputes over accreted waterfront real estate.132 When dis-
putes arise over street-art ownership, the kinds of competing 
plausible claims that normally trigger equitable division are 
likely to be present. This is because the primary doctrinal re-
gimes that might govern street-art ownership—abandonment 
and gift—do not map easily onto the unique facts of street-art 
production. Both regimes turn on artist intent, but artist intent 
will generally be unknowable. This makes disputes over street 
art look very much like difficult disputes over lost or mislaid 
property. Here, as there, competing legal regimes, combined 
with a paucity of relevant facts, generate competing plausible 
claims of ownership between the finder of street art and the 
underlying-property owner. Thus, doctrinally, equitable division 
can be applied to determine street-art ownership. 
 
 128 Id at 3:25. 
 129 See id at 3:26. 
 130 See Part II.D.  
 131 See Part II.D.  
 132 See Part II.D.  
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2. Public policy. 
As should be clear by this point, the public policy concerns 
surrounding street-art ownership are varied and complex. How-
ever, as the above discussions illustrate, the real difficulty in 
this area is finding a balance between two kinds of values. First, 
given that street art is continuously under the threat of deface-
ment and destruction, it is vitally important that any ownership 
regime promote street art’s preservation and, thus, its eventual 
movement toward its highest-value use. This means ensuring 
that there are incentives for those who are able to readily identi-
fy and protect valuable street art to do so. A pure abandonment 
regime serves this purpose well by giving full ownership of valu-
able street art to whoever finds and preserves it. However, a 
pure abandonment regime fares very poorly with regard to the 
second set of values. For very sticky street art like spray-paint 
murals, value preservation comes into direct conflict with the 
goals of promoting free alienation and preventing fragmenta-
tion. If finders take full ownership of street art, they force alien-
ation and fragmentation for any sufficiently sticky street art. 
Accession can step in to ameliorate this problem, but it, in turn, 
does so only at the expense of street-art preservation and highest-
value use. Thus, the primary policy goal of the law becomes rec-
onciling preservation and highest-value use on the one hand 
with alienation and fragmentation problems on the other. 
Resolving private disputes over street art with equitable di-
vision allows courts to have their cake and eat it too. By award-
ing finders a share of any street art they discover, equitable di-
vision, like abandonment, creates incentives that promote 
street-art preservation and highest-value use. Moreover, equita-
ble division, unlike the hybrid abandonment/accession regime, 
can apply to all street art.  
But doesn’t equitable division create the same alienation 
and fragmentation problems as abandonment? If a finder takes 
partial ownership of a very sticky artwork attached to private 
property and that ownership necessarily includes some right to 
the underlying property, it looks as if that underlying property 
has been fragmented. Furthermore, if the finder has some say as 
to whether the art should remain where it was placed, be moved, 
or be sold, it looks as if the underlying-property owner’s right of 
free alienation might be impinged. 
Equitable division can avoid these problems by functioning in 
the following manner: A court would not divide ownership of street 
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art equally with each party holding equal rights over the artwork 
in all respects. Rather, it would grant the finder something less 
than full co-ownership, unbundling the various rights that art 
ownership usually implies. It would treat the finder as a minority 
shareholder in the piece, granting her only some percentage of the 
value of the work. Courts should attempt to coalesce around a 
more or less uniform percentage divide in order to avoid the un-
predictability of an ad hoc regime.133 Under such a system, the 
finder’s only right with regard to the street art would be the 
right to collect some percentage of the work’s sale price should 
the property owner ever choose to sell it. That right would vest 
only upon a work’s sale, so the finder would collect nothing if the 
work never sold or was destroyed. The underlying-property own-
er would retain the power to make all other decisions regarding 
the artwork and its underlying property, including decisions 
about artwork placement, alienation, and even destruction. 
Such an arrangement eliminates any problem of free aliena-
tion. Under equitable division, it is not the case that by, for ex-
ample, spray-painting a mural on someone’s wall, a street artist 
thereby makes a portion of that wall fair game for partial own-
ership by finders. This Comment proposes that courts equitably 
divide only the artwork and never the underlying property to 
which it is attached. Thus, a finder never takes ownership of an-
ything that belonged to the property owner prior to the art-
work’s placement. There is no reason here to invoke the doctrine 
of accession to treat any artwork as having merged with the un-
derlying property into a new, unitary property. Doing so solves 
no problems, because the finder’s right to a portion of some sale 
value has nothing to do with the underlying property. Unlike 
under the pure abandonment regime, the finder does not require 
rights to the underlying property to make her interest in the 
artwork meaningful. 
Because the finder does not take rights to anything other 
than a portion of the net sale value of the artwork itself, disposi-
tion of the artwork and the underlying property would be entire-
ly within the purview of the property owner. If the owner wished 
to excise the artwork from her building and sell it at auction, 
 
 133 This Comment takes no position on what the proper percentage would be. It is 
noteworthy, however, that under the German system, finders of lost property are usually 
entitled to a finder’s fee of just 5 percent of the found property’s value. Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch [BGB] (the German Civil Code, as amended Jan 2, 2002) § 971. This amount 
has presumably proved to be enough to incentivize finders.  
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she could do so. She would merely owe the finder his due share 
of the sale’s net revenues. If the owner wished to destroy the 
artwork, she could do so with impunity. It would likely be foolish 
of her to make such a decision, given that she would know that 
at least one party—the finder—might be willing to buy the 
work. But the property owner would remain free to be foolish; 
the finder’s right would not place a duty on the property owner 
to either prevent the artwork’s destruction or to abstain from 
destroying it herself. 
The only duty that the property owner would owe to the 
finder would be a duty not to fraudulently deprive the finder of 
her fair share of a sale, should such a sale take place. For exam-
ple, such an artwork could be attached to a home, and the prop-
erty owner might wish to sell the entire home, including the 
artwork. The property owner would then have to pay the finder 
the latter’s share of the home’s sale price that was driven by the 
artwork. Such an amount could be easily calculated by having 
the artwork appraised. Better still, the homeowner could simply 
sell the home and the artwork separately, even if to a single 
buyer. But the property owner could not collude with the buyer 
to inflate the home price and sell the art at a nominal price for 
the purpose of avoiding payment of the finder’s fair share. Such 
fraud would constitute a legal cause of action for the finder. 
While such possibilities of fraud may seem to imply complicated, 
unadministrable duties between finder and property owner, 
nothing could be further from the truth. The property owner’s 
duties are simple: pay a portion of the artwork’s sale price and 
do not commit fraud. Courts routinely adjudicate disputes aris-
ing out of fiduciary relationships orders of magnitude more com-
plex than this. 
There is only one other manner in which the finder’s right to 
a portion of the sale value and the property owner’s rights to the 
underlying property might interact. Some sales of street art will 
require the sale of some portion of the underlying property. Re-
moval and sale of a spray-paint mural from a wall requires the 
removal and sale of some portion of the underlying wall. The 
finder, again, has no interest in the underlying wall. Hence, if 
an artwork’s sale price reflects, to some extent, the excised 
wall’s value, that value is not included in the net revenue of 
which the finder is owed a share. However, such a situation is 
unlikely, as small portions of excised brick or drywall are essen-
tially valueless. Either way, at no time does equitable division 
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grant anyone but the underlying-property owner any interest in 
the underlying property. Thus, equitable division of street art 
poses no serious threats to free alienation. 
Fragmentation would also cease to be a problem under equi-
table division. Potential buyers of property to which street art 
was attached would not have to worry that the property might 
remain subject to some third-party interest. The finder’s interest in 
the art would terminate with any sale, and the finder’s subsequent 
claim for payment would be against her former co-owner alone. 
3. Legality of the proposed division. 
Doctrinally speaking, it is entirely plausible that courts 
could arrange the terms of equitable division in the manner pro-
posed above. First, courts are not required to equitably divide 
any property evenly among its claimants, so they could split 
street art’s value unevenly. For example, when equitably divid-
ing accreted waterfront land between two littoral landowners, 
courts do not divide the new property equally, but rather in such 
a way that the new proportions of waterfront-land ownership re-
flect those that existed prior to the accretion.134 
Nor must courts grant any party the full suite of rights that 
usually accompanies ownership of chattels. Owners of chattels 
are generally free to alienate or not alienate as they please.135 
Nevertheless, in Popov, after awarding equal shares of the Barry 
Bonds home run ball to Popov and Hayashi, the court ordered 
the ball to be sold, stripping both parties of that common property 
right.136 Thus, there is no reason to think that a court could not 
award finders of street art solely the right to a percentage of the 
art’s sale price. 
Finally, courts could stipulate that the finder’s right vests 
only upon an artwork’s sale, allowing the underlying-property 
owner to destroy the work if necessary. The law allows equitably 
divided interests to be temporally limited; for example, Popov 
and Hayashi were forced to terminate their ownership rights as 
 
 134 See, for example, Lorusso v Acapesket Improvement Association, Inc, 564 NE2d 
360, 367–68 (Mass 1990). 
 135 See Merrill I. Schnebly, Restraints upon the Alienation of Legal Interests: I, 44 
Yale L J 961, 961 (1935) (“Since an early date in the history of the English common law, 
it has been thought socially and economically desirable that the owner of a present fee 
simple in land, or of a corresponding absolute interest in chattels, should have the power 
to transfer his interest.”). 
 136 Popov, 2002 WL 31833731 at *8.  
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soon as practicable.137 Furthermore, courts regularly award fu-
ture interests in other equitable contexts. For example, a court 
of equity may assign a future interest as part of a contract, 
even when that contract mentions no such interest.138 Thus, it 
is entirely plausible that courts could likewise grant finders of 
street art a future interest in a given artwork that would vest on-
ly upon the sale of that piece. 
In summation, the application of equitable division serves 
each relevant policy goal at least as well as any other regime 
and implies none of the other regimes’ ill effects. Most im-
portantly, it incentivizes finders to locate valuable street art, 
promoting the artwork’s preservation and highest-value use. 
Unlike the hybrid abandonment/accession regime, it does so for 
all works of street art; unlike the pure abandonment regime, it 
does not present problems for free alienation or fragmentation. 
Furthermore, equitable division is at least as doctrinally plausi-
ble as any other regime. Disputes over street-art ownership are 
likely to arise primarily between finders and owners of property 
on which the art was placed. In such situations, the laws of 
abandonment and gift interact in much the same way as the 
laws of loss and mislaying might, generating competing plausi-
ble claims. Such situations are exactly those in which equitable 
division is permitted. Thus, equitable division both can and 
should govern disputes over street-art ownership. 
CONCLUSION 
The law of ownership, as it relates to street art, implicates 
well-worn doctrines but unprecedented fact patterns. While it is 
clear that a number of doctrinal areas could resolve such dis-
putes, the factual difficulties surrounding street art render the 
relevant doctrinal tests impotent. As episodes like the Mobile 
Lovers and Slave Labour controversies demonstrate, the stories 
surrounding the production, discovery, and ownership of street 
art are not quite like anything else in property law. Doctrinally, 
equitable division avoids such ineffectual tests, allowing courts 
to resolve disputes sensibly. From a policy perspective, the ap-
plication of equitable division is, by a great margin, socially op-
timal. Such a regime does little or nothing to incentivize bad 
public effects like trespass and fragmentation. Most important-
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ly, it does much better than the alternatives at producing two 
desirable results: the prevention of street-art destruction and 
the movement of street art toward its highest-value use. Under 
such a regime, many culturally significant works of art that 
would otherwise perish will live on for future generations to en-
joy. Such preservation creates a significant benefit for artists, 
collectors, art lovers, and, arguably, society at large.  
